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War Crimes Allegations and the UK: 
Towards a Fairer Investigative Process 
 
Andrew Williams1 
University of Warwick 
War crimes allegations have dogged the UK military for decades. Yet there is no settled 
process to deal with them. Different legal responses deployed have all suffered from 
complaints of unfairness. This article proposes foundations for a more satisfactory approach 
based on an existing three-part consensus. First, that norms governing individual and 
systemic conduct in military conflict are relatively undisputed; second, that the state has a 
non-negotiable investigatory duty should a suspected breach occur; and third, that any 
investigation should take into account the context within which it is conducted. The article 
then advances three propositions: (1) first order principles of practicability, expertise, and 
investigator independence should provide the non-negotiable foundations of any response; 
(2) second order principles including promptness, adequacy, reasonable transparency, and 
respect for basic standards of natural justice should apply when practicable; and (3) a 
standing institution designed to comply with the first and second order principles would 
provide a fairer process for all participants (accused, victim and the wider national and 
international communities) whilst also fulfilling coherence and legal certainty requirements. 
The article concludes that current structures cannot fulfil these demands and it explores the 
basis for a better alternative.  
 
Key words: public law; war crimes; accountability; investigations; fairness 
Introduction 
Allegations of war crimes have dogged the UK Armed Forces over the past decade or more. 
Multiple claims regarding unlawful killing and ill-treatment of detainees in Iraq, Afghanistan, 
Northern Ireland, the Falklands, Cyprus and other past military engagements, continue to 
provoke national and international concern.2 Many have become acute political issues 
prompting considerable tension as to how they might be resolved. Yet there has been and 
remains no settled process to deal with their investigation. Instead, the UK has deployed a 
                                                          
1 I am grateful to Victor Tadros, Owen Thomas and Victoria Basham for their comments on earlier drafts of this 
article and suggestions for improvement.  
2 I have outlined elsewhere failures of public law vis-à-vis the rule of law and human rights specifically in 
relation to the Iraq allegations. See Andrew Williams, ‘The Iraq abuse allegations and the limits of UK law’ 
(2018) Public Law Jul, 461-481. See also Carla Ferstman, Thomas Obel Hansen and Noora Arajärvi, ‘The UK 
Military in Iraq: Efforts and Prospect for Accountability for International Crimes Allegations? 1 October 2018 
available at https://www1.essex.ac.uk/hrc/documents/THE_UK_MILITARY_IN_IRAQ_1Oct2018.pdf 
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broad range of differing, often ad hoc, legal or governmental responses. Public inquiries, 
inquests, parliamentary committee scrutiny, internal Ministry of Defence review, civil and 
judicial review litigation, and coronial-type examinations have supplemented established 
military criminal justice processes for both investigation and resolution of allegations of 
wrongdoing. All have suffered from accusations of unfairness of one form or another for 
those affected (accused, victims and their families, military institutions and the public at 
large). Although different actors perceive different kinds of unfairness, the legal incoherence 
of the UK’s response has aggravated these perceptions. Uncertainty as to the applicable 
process acts to the detriment of all concerned. It also diminishes law’s value as a means of 
attaining accountability for alleged individual and systemic wrongdoing committed by state 
agents in the war context.3 Even if individual processes may appear fair to some parties for 
some of the time, the confusion and uncertainty perpetuates critiques of unfairness. 
 The recent political proposal to protect armed forces personnel and ‘veterans’ by 
introducing a statute of limitations to restrict investigations into historic crimes of war is 
unlikely to resolve this condition.4 It may even exacerbate it. Consequently, in this article, I 
argue for a different solution, one that seeks to address the enduring uncertainty 
accompanying the investigatory issue. I attempt to lay the foundations for fulfilling the state’s 
obligations to investigate fairly (whether or not as a precursor to prosecution) on the initial 
plausible assumptions that: (a) war crimes are of a different order from ordinary crimes of 
                                                          
3 I use the term ‘war context’ throughout to encompass both internal and international armed conflicts as defined 
by International Humanitarian Law.  
4 In 2018, the House of Commons Defence Committee launched an inquiry into how investigations against 
service personnel could be subject to a statute of limitations. Analysis of a public consultation by the Northern 
Ireland Office into this proposal was published in July 2019 (see 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/814805/Addre
ssing_the_Legacy_of_the_Past_-_Analysis_of_the_consultation_responses.pdf) The original proposal follows a 
long tradition of political opposition to war crimes investigations. See for instance concern regarding police 
enquiries into allegations of unlawful killing in the Falklands War and the delay in resolving them: ‘Falklands 
War Crimes Investigation’ HL Deb 03 May 1994 vol 554 cc1006-9. 
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violence and deserve special and specific attention; 5 (b) whatever the disputes about the 
broader aims of accountability processes, there is a moral duty to investigate serious 
wrongdoing committed in war accurately and fairly, and to hold wrongdoers publicly to 
account for their wrongdoing;6 and (c) such investigations should adhere to a reasonable, but 
context specific, set of fairness standards for the benefit of those constituencies or individuals 
affected. My aim, then, is to encourage a move towards a more credible, certain and fairer 
investigatory scheme when war crimes are alleged.7  
To this end, in section 1, I demonstrate that even though current UK practices might 
suggest otherwise, there already exists consensus on three relevant issues. First, on the 
applicable norms and substantive obligations related to individual and systemic conduct in 
military conflict; second, that the state has a non-negotiable investigatory duty should a 
suspected breach of those obligations occur; and third, that any standards of investigation 
fulfilling the investigatory duty should take into account the context within which such 
investigations are to be conducted.  
Informed by this three-part consensus, I then advance, in section 2, a series of three 
propositions that I contend should underpin the state’s response to any war crimes allegedly 
committed by its forces. First, rather than assume that all standards (often but misleadingly 
subsumed within ‘fair trial rights’) associated with contemporary notions of fair criminal 
investigations automatically apply, first order principles of practicability, expertise, and 
                                                          
5 The term ‘war crimes’ reflects the condemnation not of killing per se, even of civilians, but of killing that 
transgresses the limits placed on the conduct of war. In this, they are not simply domestic crimes redefined for a 
different context. The war crimes norm also reflects its potential systemic quality in each and every alleged 
violation. All war crimes provoke collective responsibility if patterns of repetition show acquiescence or 
command in their committal or in the failure to prevent or punish.  
6 The purpose of the criminal justice system and punishment remains the subject of much debate at both national 
and international level. This does not affect the need for establishing the truth of any allegations. It would be 
relatively uncontroversial to claim that there is a moral duty to investigate serious wrongdoing accurately and 
fairly and hold those responsible to account across models. 
7 Although my focus is on the UK experience, I acknowledge that other states face similar issues. For instance, 
New Zealand has questioned the appropriateness of their accountability processes in the light of allegations 
concerning specific operations in Afghanistan. The Inquiry into Operation Burnham (which resulted in the 
deaths of several Afghan civilians) was launched in 2018: see https://operationburnham.inquiry.govt.nz/  
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investigator independence should provide the non-negotiable foundations of a state’s 
response. Second, subsidiary principles recognised as necessary for a fair investigative 
process to be compliant with International Human Rights Law (IHRL) (including 
promptness, adequacy, public notification of outcomes, reasonable transparency of process, 
and respect for basic standards of natural justice) should apply to the fullest extent possible as 
and when practicable and generally subject to first order principles. Third, that to ensure 
compliance with the first order and subsidiary principles, whilst also fulfilling legal 
coherence and legal certainty requirements, a dedicated independent and standing institution 
tailored for the war context would be the most plausible solution.  
I conclude the article by arguing that current structures and legal frameworks (whether in 
the military or civil criminal justice systems) cannot fulfil these demands as currently 
constituted. Nor do the recent and specific proposals for multiple institutions to deal with 
‘legacy crimes’ in Northern Ireland address the whole set of outstanding and possible future 
war crimes allegations against the UK.8 I therefore explore some possibilities for the 
construction of a better alternative that accords with the established consensus and my three 
propositions. 
 
1. War Crimes Investigations: The Existing Consensus  
If it is accepted that the current war crimes investigatory and accountability structures 
operating in the UK are incoherent and perceived as unfair, how can a more effective system 
be established? My starting point is to identify those areas of consensus that can provide the 
foundations of a more suitable scheme. Three areas present themselves: first, the norms that 
govern the conduct of military forces in armed conflict; second, the investigatory duty that 
                                                          
8 The Stormont House Agreement 2014 at para 30 provided for the creation of a Historical Investigations Unit, 
to be a ‘new independent body to take forward investigations into outstanding Troubles-related deaths’ 
compliant with Article 2 ECHR requirements. It also agreed that an Oral History Archive and an Independent 
Commission on Information Retrieval would be instituted to deal with the past. 
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accords to a state once any suspected breach of those norms by its forces comes to light; and 
third, the impact of the war context on what is deemed practicable in fulfilling the 
investigatory duty. I deal with these in turn below. 
 
(a) Consensus on Substantive Norms 
Few claim seriously that the various established norms of International Humanitarian Law 
(IHL) should not apply to UK forces in war. Few argue that if UK personnel breach these 
norms, they should not be held to account for such violations. It seems uncontroversial 
therefore to argue that the standards applicable to the operations of the UK’s military are 
relatively certain. The obligations contained in the Geneva Conventions 1949, and those in 
the 1977 Additional Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions, in particular, as well as 
multiple other international instruments have been accepted without serious reservation by 
the UK and by most states.9 
 There is also reasonably significant international consensus over what and when 
breaches of these standards might constitute a war crime. Though there is ambiguity in the 
Geneva Conventions (equating ‘grave’ breaches of only some of its provisions with war 
crimes),10 Article 8 International Criminal Court Statute now provides a contemporary 
definition that has global support. Few again would be surprised by or challenge the list in its 
entirety.11  
For the UK, there is less likelihood of dispute following the adoption of the 
International Criminal Court Act 2001. This incorporated war crimes (as well as genocide, 
and crimes against humanity) as defined by the ICC Statute, into UK law making them 
                                                          
9 India, Turkey, Pakistan and the USA, Israel and Iran have not ratified Additional Protocol I. 
10 See Article 85 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Additional Protocol I), 8 June 1977. 
11 Article 8 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998 (‘Rome Statute’) includes specific 
reference to wilful killing, rape, torture, inhuman treatment, depriving protected persons of a fair trial and 
intentional acts targeting civilians amongst many other offences. 
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directly applicable to UK forces. The Armed Forces Act 2006 reinforced this by listing the 
ICC designated crimes as ‘serious offences’ that a unit commanding officer is obliged to 
report to the service police force as ‘soon as reasonably practicable’ after becoming aware of 
their occurrence.12  
 Consensus is equally evident on the understanding of responsibility that may be 
associated with the commission of war related crimes. Since the Nuremberg Charter and the 
scheme of justice delivered in post-Second World War Europe, individuals have been 
identified as primarily accountable either as direct perpetrators or as commanders (political 
and military). In the latter case, command responsibility ensures that those who knowingly or 
negligently order, allow or encourage, tolerate their continued commission or fail to act when 
aware that war crimes are or have been taking place, are valid subjects of investigation.13 
Although this individual responsibility approach dominates thinking about war crimes 
investigation (as a prelude to individual prosecution), it is also recognised that ‘system 
criminality’ may require scrutiny.14 In other words, the role of a system or culture, plan or 
policy that enables or encourages war crimes to be committed (through perceived doctrine or 
training methods or other forms of encouragement) should be addressed through some legal 
process, though not necessarily criminal prosecution.15  
In the UK, however, the Armed Forces Act places a barrier in the examination of 
systemic wrongdoing. Where there is evidence of multiple offences or offenders, the service 
police are required to regard each ‘person’s conduct in relation to each incident’ as ‘giving 
rise to a separate case.’16 As I have discussed elsewhere, this is indicative of the legal and 
institutional preference for the investigation of individual perpetrators over potential systemic 
                                                          
12 See s113(1) Armed Forces Act 2006.  
13 Command responsibility is reflected in s65 ICC Act 2001 in the UK. 
14 For a sustained review, see Andre Nollkaemper and Harmen van der Wilt (eds) System Criminality in 
International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
15 Draft Articles on Responsibility of State for internationally Wrongful Acts 2001. 
16 See s117 Armed Forces Act 2006.  
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issues at least as regards criminal sanction.17 Only if some institution (through Parliament or 
politically appointed inquiry) is tasked specifically with examining the patterns, policies and 
institutional cultures that provoke abusive behaviour, will systemic issues be formally 
uncovered and assessed. As things stand any independent investigation into state, 
governmental or military accountability for systemic wrongs is therefore only likely to arise 
through political movement or perhaps provoked by occasional and protracted civil litigation 
(either judicial review proceedings or actions for civil damages).18  
The institutional resistance to systemic scrutiny, in terms of the avoidance of 
independent and timely examination and attribution of responsibility, has been particularly 
evident in recent allegations relating to the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. Although the Ministry 
of Defence instituted the Systemic Issues Working Group in 2014, which reports annually, its 
terms of reference are limited to identifying, reviewing, and correcting ‘doctrine, policy and 
training’ deemed insufficient in IHL terms.19 It holds no remit to seek accountability for 
wrongdoing. The same is true for concerns over historic practices in the Northern Ireland 
conflict, where the alleged ‘shoot to kill’ policy, coordinated ill-treatment of detainees 
(amounting to torture), and collusion with paramilitaries have all presented as potential 
systemic wrongs that have avoided coordinated scrutiny, let alone individual or institutional 
accountability. Any investigation has been on an ad hoc basis, mostly through internal (and 
sometimes in secret) Ministry of Defence or Armed Forces review or very exceptional public 
or other police type inquiry.20 Individual or state accountability for systemic war crimes has 
rarely materialised, though there have been exceptions with occasional government apology 
                                                          
17 See [   ], above n 2. 
18 For instance, in relation to detention practices during the occupation of Iraq 2003-2009, the decision in Ali 
Zaki Mousa (No.2) reserved the scrutiny of credible systemic wrongdoing to Parliament; see Ali Zaki Mousa & 
others -v- Secretary of State for Defence (No. 2) [2013] EWHC 1412 (Admin) at [224]. 
19 See SWIG reports available at https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/review-of-systemic-issues-arising-
from-military-operations-overseas-index  
20 The John Stalker examination (and that of his successor Colin Sampson) into the ‘shoot to kill’ policy 
allegedly operating in Northern Ireland by the security forces in the early 1980s has never been made public.  
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after acceptance of wrongdoing and state payment of compensation without acceptance of 
liability.21 
Whatever the UK record, there is clear consensus over both the standards generally 
applicable and the persons who might be examined as responsible when any allegation of 
individual and systemic wrongdoing in war is made. It follows that any declaration of 
‘combat immunity’ for whatever level of command or operation could not be tolerated within 
any rule of law respecting state as a solution to the investigatory problem. The House of 
Commons Defence Committee’s current inquiry into ‘how service personnel can be protected 
from the spectre of investigation and reinvestigation for events that happened many years, 
and often decades, earlier’ strays into that immunity territory.22 Seeking a statute of 
limitations for investigations into allegations of war crimes does not adhere to the substantive 
obligations outlined above. The generally accepted international legal commitment for ‘every 
State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes’ is 
not time bound.23 Similarly, the state has a duty to address relevant human rights norms that 
may have been breached even if committed in a war context though I would contend that this 
only applies to specific rights the breach of which can be interpreted as war crimes.24 
 
(b) Consensus on the Investigatory Duty 
                                                          
21 On damages paid for alleged abuses see for instance claims relating to Cyprus at 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/23/britain-to-pay-group-of-greek-cypriots-1m-after-claims-of-
human-rights-abuse  
22 See Defence Committee: Statute of Limitations – veterans protection inquiry - Scope of the Inquiry available 
at https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/defence-
committee/inquiries/parliament-2017/inquiry13/  
23 Preamble para.6 Rome Statute above n 11. 
24 The International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 
(8 July 1996) paras 24–25 held that international human rights do not ‘cease in time of war’. But it also accepted 
that ‘whether a particular loss of life, through the use of a certain weapon in warfare, is to be considered an 
arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to Article 6 of the [UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights], can only be 
decided by reference to the law applicable in armed conflict and not deduced from the terms of the Covenant 
itself’.  
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It seems equally uncontentious that where there is reasonable suspicion of war crimes having 
been committed the state party responsible has the primary and inalienable duty to carry out 
an investigation. Rule 158 of the ICRC’s rules of customary IHL provides,  
 
States must investigate war crimes allegedly committed by their nationals or armed 
forces, or on their territory, and, if appropriate, prosecute the suspects. They must also 
investigate other war crimes over which they have jurisdiction and, if appropriate, 
prosecute the suspects.25 
  
 This is explicit for the treatment of detainees. Article 131 Geneva Convention IV 
1949 states that ‘[e]very death or serious injury…shall be immediately followed by an 
official enquiry by the Detainee Power.’  
States, such as the UK, which have ratified the ICC Statute, are also affected by the 
rules governing complementarity. The ICC’s jurisdiction will not be triggered unless the 
responsible signatory state is unwilling or unable to investigate or prosecute the case 
concerned.26 This has apparently incentivised the UK to investigate war crimes allegations 
arising from both the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts.27 Fears that the ICC might step in have 
at least appeared to drive some of the processes that have contributed to the chaos of 
accountability I mentioned at the beginning of this article.  
 The UK’s Ministry of Defence Manual on the Laws of Armed Conflict recognises the 
political value in investigating allegations of war crimes too, stating, 
                                                          
25 The rule stems from provisions of various IHL instruments including Article 121 Third and Article 131 
Fourth Geneva Conventions 1949.  
26 Article 17(1)(a) Rome Statute above n 11. 
27 Former Attorney-General, Jeremy Wright QC, commented to the House of Commons Defence Committee 
‘we must be aware of the fact that if we are not demonstrating to the ICC that we are investigating these matters 
properly, the chances of the ICC deciding to do it for us are very much increased. It seems to me that that 
situation is best avoided.’ Q186 Oral Evidence 19 October 2016 available at 
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/defence-
subcommittee/mod-support-for-former-and-serving-personnel-subject-to-judicial-processes/oral/41503.html 
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Complaints of unlawful acts and omissions alleged to have been committed by 
individuals or by commanders are an almost inevitable feature of warfare…Failure by 
belligerent governments to investigate and, where appropriate, punish the alleged 
unlawful acts of members of their armed forces can contribute to the loss of public 
and world support, leading to isolation for the state involved.28 
  
Whatever the motivation, there is little moral argument raised against the state’s duty 
to investigate individual and systemic accountability issues. Of course, during international 
armed conflicts there may be significant political and military pressure to avoid investigation 
into war crimes allegedly committed by one’s own troops, at least whilst military operations 
continue. Arguments of military necessity could justify avoiding public and/or internal 
scrutiny on the basis that it would undermine morale. At a time when victory is the main goal 
of military action, any investigation that might not contribute directly to the war effort, and 
might even adversely affect it by questioning the moral virtue of one’s own forces, could be 
considered unwarranted. Such an argument only has force for so long as hostilities continue. 
The duty is only suspended rather than dismissed. Even then, some will argue alternatively 
that as military discipline is essential for the efficient prosecution of armed conflict and 
observance of the laws of war is enshrined in military law, then any failure to address 
suspected war crimes immediately will undermine the application of that law and jeopardise 
discipline to the detriment of fighting effectiveness. For individual crimes at least, a lack of 
immediate scrutiny, if not accountability, for wrongdoing can threaten public support for the 
armed forces, erode confidence and professional pride, and reduce effectiveness as a result. 
There are therefore strong moral and practical reasons for the investigatory duty to apply as 
                                                          
28 Ministry of Defence, Joint Service Manual on the Law of Armed Conflict 2004 para 16.1.2. 
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soon as reasonably practicable. Military law reflects this appeal and international human 
rights law (IHRL) reinforces the obligation.29 
Even if states may derogate from some human rights commitments during an internal 
or international armed conflict, this does not affect the specific national legal obligations 
regarding unlawful killing and the right not to be tortured, nor the application of the rules 
governing armed conflict to military operations within the state. That has become a settled 
principle within European Human Rights Convention law and accepted in UK law too.30 The 
obligation to investigate war crimes remains an acknowledged aspect of the rule of law.31 
The position becomes slightly more complicated when systemic wrongdoing is 
alleged, but even here, the underlying duty to investigate remains. Though a systemic issue 
may require evidence of repeated behaviour or a revelation of plan or policy to commit war 
crimes in order to prompt specific scrutiny, the need for investigation is still accepted.32 The 
duty may be triggered some time after the wrongdoing has been committed, but the 
requirement for proper investigation subsists until or if evidence of systemic crimes 
materialises.  
 
(c) Consensus on the War Context 
                                                          
29 See McCann and Others v United Kingdom, ECtHR, App No 18984/91, paras. 149–150 (27 Sept.1995) where 
the ECtHR held that deprivations of life must be subject to ‘the most careful scrutiny, particularly where 
deliberate lethal force is used, taking into consideration not only the actions of the agents of the State who 
actually administer the force but also all the surrounding circumstances including such matters as the planning 
and control of the actions under examination.’  
30 Article 15(2) European Convention on Human Rights 1950 provides ‘No derogation from Article 2, except in 
respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war, or from Articles 3, 4 (paragraph 1) and 7 shall be made 
under this provision.’ 
31 House of Commons Defence Committee, ‘Who guards the guardians? MoD support for former and serving 
personnel’, Sixth Report of Session 2016–17 (TSO, 2017), HC 109, which concluded (inter alia) ‘As a nation 
we expect our servicemen and women to conduct themselves at the highest levels of professionalism on 
operations. Where the rule of law is broken, justice must be done in military as in civilian life.’ 
32 See s113(1) and (2) Armed Forces Act 2006 which provides that any unit Commanding Officer must inform 
the service police of an allegation ‘as soon as is reasonably practicable’ if it would ‘indicate to a reasonable 
person’ that a serious offence has been committed (the list of offences includes war crimes in Schedule 2 of the 
Act). 
12 
  
Though the consensus on substantive norms and investigatory duty is strong, the standards, 
form and timing of any investigation (in short, what amounts to an objective ‘fair’ 
investigation) are contested. I return to this question in section 2, but for now it is at least 
uncontroversial that the precise context within which any alleged breach occurs will have an 
impact on how and on what terms an investigation is conducted. It might seem counter-
intuitive to suppose any investigation into a crime could be both unfair and legitimate, but the 
circumstances of war, where the enemy is denied certain rights or respect as an inherent 
condition of conflict, may reduce the fairness obligation below what is generally accepted as 
apt in peacetime. Whatever ideal standards of fairness may be preferred, the war context 
renders contingent the exact requirements of fairness whilst conflict persists. Some 
compromise may be necessary (such as in relation to the preservation or access to crime 
scenes, the interview of witnesses, the collection of physical evidence) but not to the extent 
that accountability processes should be dispensed with altogether. 
 IHRL and IHL recognise both the duty and the constrictions of the war context. In Al 
Skeini the European Court of Human Rights found that where an investigation is merited, 
‘obstacles may be placed in the way of investigators’.33 It drew on UN Special Rapporteur 
Philip Alston’s finding that even though military operations might impede investigations they 
will ‘never discharge the obligation to investigate - this would eviscerate the non-derogable 
character of the right to life - but they may affect the modalities or particulars of the 
investigation.’34 The obligation (under article 2 ECHR in this case) remains, so that ‘even in 
difficult security conditions, all reasonable steps must be taken to ensure that an effective, 
independent investigation is conducted.’35 It follows that this is particularly so if an 
investigation were potentially for the purposes of instigating (or discounting) the prosecution 
                                                          
33 See Al-Skeini And Others v The United Kingdom (Grand Chamber), ECtHR, Appl. no. 55721/07, 7 July 
2011,para 164. 
34 Report no. E/CN.4/2006/53 on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions (8 March 2006) at para 36 
35 See above n 33. 
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of an individual. Then, the demands of most accounts of criminal justice (international and 
domestic) would still require observance of certain standards during the investigatory stage of 
proceedings for the benefit of the accused (and in many accounts, the victims and their 
families) as essential components of a fair process. Failure to do so appropriately may 
weaken that process in terms of its public support particularly if the interests of the state’s 
nationals were prejudiced. The requirement applies equally to investigating individual and 
systemic wrongdoing.36   
If I am right in this, then matters of jurisdiction (IHL or IHRL), which have taxed the 
legal response to the Iraq allegations in particular, become otiose as far as the investigatory 
duty is concerned. Though there may be good reason to draw on the experience of human 
rights law and practice in fact-finding or other enquiry, which has developed at considerably 
greater pace than the laws of war since 1945, there is also good reason to acknowledge the 
differing circumstances and contexts of military conflict and operation in designing an apt 
response. This is not a reason to ignore human rights norms. Louise Doswald-Beck makes a 
case for human rights law standards to ‘supplement and interpret’ IHL.37 Nonetheless, the 
war context (creating special moral questions) arguably requires a more sophisticated 
approach than either the application of domestically recognised substantive and procedural 
human rights tout court or their denial. Reliance on one body of law or another to govern how 
war crimes allegations should be addressed at the investigatory stage provides too binary an 
approach to solve what is a complex problem. The variety of scenarios where agreed 
                                                          
36 What is practicable for armed forces in fulfilling any duty has been a relevant consideration in many court 
analyses. For instance, in Alseran and others v Ministry of Defence [2017] EWHC 3289 (QB) 14 para 356 when 
assessing the UK’s responsibilities regarding detention practices, Mr Justice Leggatt stated ‘it is also necessary 
to recognise the practical exigencies of the situation which confronted HM Forces at the time, and to endeavour 
to apply the Convention in a manner which is feasible in the real world.’  
37 Louise Doswald-Beck, ‘The right to life in armed conflict: does international humanitarian law provide all the 
answers?’ (2006) 88:864 International Review of the Red Cross 881-904. Mark Osiel for one disagrees. See his 
The End of Reciprocity: Terror, Torture, and the Law of War (CUP, 2009) 127 et seq. 
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standards may be breached (international or internal armed conflicts, full-blown invasion and 
occupation or brief skirmish or intervention) lend themselves to a tailored solution.  
Systemic issues particularly warrant such consideration. For instance, any 
investigation into an alleged ‘shoot to kill policy’ may be prima facie preposterous if applied 
to belligerents in an international or internal armed conflict of sufficient intensity,38 but prima 
facie essential and expected in another context (for instance, police or anti-terrorist operations 
in peacetime).39 Recognising the war context is merely a restraint on the investigative duty 
only for so long, and in so far, as conflict might prevent the full application of the agreed 
standards. It would not determine that IHL (or International Criminal Law for that matter) 
held exclusive preserve over the standards of investigation expected. The practical 
application of the investigatory duty should not be fixed according to any one moment of 
assessment but flexible so that evidence collection in particular would reflect what was 
possible as circumstances changed.   
So, although the context of war does not warrant avoiding proper standards of 
investigation and due process altogether, it does alter expectations with respect to the 
application of those standards in practice. This may lead to some temporary compromise on 
fairness as might otherwise be expected from domestic criminal investigations.  
 
2. Towards an Alternative Investigatory Scheme: Three Propositions 
 
Despite the plausible consensus on norms, investigatory duty and appreciation of the war 
context outlined above, there is no current consensus over how war crimes should be 
                                                          
38 Prosecutor v Duško Tadić (Jurisdiction of the Tribunal) ICTY Case No IT-94-1-AR72 (2 October 1995) 
decided that an internal armed conflict would be called such where it satisfied requirements of sufficient 
duration, intensity and degree of organisation of the non-state actors engaged. 
39 Though this may be generally true, there would still be scope to assess any killing as unlawful if it breached 
the principle of inflicting unnecessary suffering or other rules preventing a policy of ‘no quarter’ or the killing 
of combatants hors de combat. See, in particular, Articles 35(2), 40 and 41 Additional Protocol I above n 10. 
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investigated at any particular time and vis-à-vis any particular allegation. It is relatively 
uncontroversial to say, however, that there should be a procedural commitment to conduct 
some kind of inquiry that is fair. But how might this be arranged? What standards of fairness 
can be expected?  
Given the impact of the war context on the investigatory duty, it seems implausible to 
adopt a list of ideal and detailed standards (fashioned to examine abuses of individual rights 
to life, integrity and dignity as well as an accused’s domestic right to fair trial) that will 
necessarily and frequently be breached in practice. Equally, reliance upon those principles of 
investigation currently applied in European Convention rights terms, rather than some 
investigatory standard, may not solve the conundrum. These principles have been affirmed in 
a long line of case law. Isayeva, Yusupova and Bazayeva v. Russia expressed them succinctly 
as: (a) state ‘authorities must act on their own motion once the matter has come to their 
attention’; (b) investigations must be ‘independent from those implicated’ in order to be 
‘effective’; (c) they must be prompt and reasonably expeditious to maintain ‘public 
confidence’ in ‘adherence to the rule of law and in preventing any appearance of collusion in 
or tolerance of unlawful acts’ on the part of the state’s authorities; and (d) ‘there must be 
sufficient element of public scrutiny of the investigation or its results to secure accountability 
in practice as well as in theory’, the degree of which will vary, though the ‘next-of-kin must 
be involved in the procedure’ to safeguard their interests.40  
 In broader international human rights reviews, similar principles have been identified 
as necessary for investigations into war crimes. Independence, effectiveness, promptness and 
impartiality appear as ‘universal’ requirements.41 Transparency has also been mooted as 
                                                          
40 Isayeva, Yusupova and Bazayeva v. Russia, Judgment of 24 February 2005, at 209–213.  
41 These principles have been recognised more widely in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the UN 
Human Rights Committee. See discussion in Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza 
Conflict A/HRC/12/48 25 September 2009 paras 1804-1810. 
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required.42 Despite various attempts to fix the identification of such principles (the Minnesota 
Protocol on the Investigation of Potentially Unlawful deaths is a recent expression), the war 
context is presented not as a vital conditioning factor but as an exception to the general 
standards expected.43 The Protocol suggests only that ‘[c]ertain situations, such as armed 
conflict, may pose practical challenges for the application of some aspects of the Protocol’s 
guidance.’44 Otherwise there is little regard for both the nature of war crimes as a whole 
beyond certain forms of unlawful killing and perhaps ill-treatment or torture.45 The principles 
are in any event left sufficiently vague in relation to the war context that different actors have 
licence to interpret them in different ways. The absence of a uniform definition of these 
principles and any single authoritative international body capable of reviewing state practice 
and assessing conformity with them, means that any investigation can only be judged on an 
ad hoc basis. Any demand for legal certainty and consistency of process in advance of any 
investigation is thus likely to fail. 
Seeking some clarity on the approaches in practice, Michael Schmitt examined the 
record of four states regarding alleged war crimes over recent years.46 From that study, he 
cautioned against applying some unattainable ideal list of standards applicable in peacetime. 
Though there is no significant dispute about how a ‘good investigation’ should be conducted, 
he concluded simply that investigations ‘are required only if there is reasonable suspicion or a 
credible allegation of a war crime having been committed’ and that ‘IHL does not require an 
investigation that exhausts all possible investigatory options.’47 The four ‘universal 
                                                          
42 See for instance Hugh Jordan v. United Kingdom (Application no. 24746/94) Judgment 4 may 2001 at para 
109. 
43 UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, ‘The Minnesota Protocol on the Investigation of 
Potentially Unlawful Death (2016)’ (New York and Geneva, 2017). 
44 Ibid para 20 
45 The Minnesota Protocol refers to potentially conducting post-operation investigations into casualties resulting 
from an attack (‘including the accuracy of the targeting’) but does not consider other forms of killing or 
wrongdoing in war. See Minnesota Protocol above n 43 at para 21. 
46 Canada, Australia, UK and USA were the four states examined.  
47 Michael N. Schmitt, ‘Investigating Violations of International Law in Armed Conflict’ (2011) 2 Harvard 
National Security Journal 31-84 
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principles’ need to be met, but these are open to considerable interpretation. In particular, he 
suggested independence does not have to mean that investigators should be non-military 
personnel. Equally, he argues that ‘Human rights-specific procedures such as victim 
involvement or the performance of autopsies have no normative relevance to investigations of 
IHL violations.’48 ‘As a matter of law,’ he states, ‘practices that may be legally mandated 
during a human rights investigation occurring in peacetime are supplanted by IHL standards 
during armed conflict.’49 
 The consequence of Schmitt’s approach is to accept that individual states can 
approach war crimes allegations in multiple ways. Though regard must be paid to some basic 
principles, the war context fixes the legal standards according to the moment of violation 
rather than to those agreed standards that would otherwise apply. This in effect does no more 
than reflect the current practice of the UK and other states’ authorities. Even though universal 
principles for investigation are recognised, there is no satisfactory means for interpreting how 
they interrelate. Nor is there clarity over the interaction between a proper investigation and 
those preferred rights associated with a domestic, peacetime ‘fair trial’ which protect the 
accused.50 It may not be surprising therefore that the confused range of responses by the UK 
to multiple allegations of war crimes arising in different conflicts has resulted in accusations 
of unfairness or one form or another as different processes have applied to similar allegations. 
The problem has, at least, been appreciated officially regarding allegations attached to the 
Northern Ireland ‘Troubles’. The recent consultation by the Northern Ireland Office as to how 
‘legacy crimes’ should be addressed concluded that ‘the current system needs to be reformed 
                                                          
48 Ibid at 83. 
49 Ibid. 
50 The ECtHR has long held that the right to a fair hearing has application to pre-trial proceedings, which 
includes the conduct of investigations. Such rights protect those accused at the investigatory as well as the 
hearing stage of proceedings (see, for instance, Salduz v. Turkey [GC], no. 36391/02, ECHR 2008 at paras 50-
55.) The Court must also ‘look at the proceedings as a whole, having regard to the rights of the defence but also 
to the interests of the public and the victims that crime is properly prosecuted and, where necessary, to the rights 
of witnesses’ (see Habran and Dalem v. Belgium, nos. 43000/11 and 49380/11, 17 January 2017 para 96). 
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and we have an obligation to seek to address the legacy of the past in a way that builds for the 
future.’51 But if reform is done without greater certainty over the governing principles and 
how they interrelate then it is likely the complaints of unfairness from one set of actors or 
another will continue. 
How then might this problem be resolved? I advance three propositions that could 
underpin one possible solution. 
 
Proposition 1: Identifying First Order Principles 
If the current consensus on ‘universal principles’ and fair trial rights fails to provide sufficient 
certainty, it would be more plausible to adopt a set of first order principles to direct any 
process of investigation. These principles should apply to all war crimes investigations, be 
non-negotiable, and interpreted in association with each other and with regard to the multiple 
constituencies affected, including accused, victim, witness, national and international 
community.52 Three key principles satisfy this requirement, are essential in all circumstances 
and reflect the three-part consensus on substantive norms, investigatory duty and the effect of 
the war context: practicability, expertise and independence. Though claims may be made for 
others to obtain first order status, the three I outline are, I suggest immutable. I consider them 
briefly in turn.  
‘Practicability’ follows the need to appreciate the war context expressed in my 
identification of consensus in the previous section. Much of the argument against applying 
human rights investigative duties, as they have evolved since 1945, is based on the assumed 
unrealistic application of domestic police-type enquiry in times of conflict. The ‘fog of war’ 
                                                          
51 Northern Ireland Office, ‘Addressing the Legacy of Northern Ireland’s Past: Analysis of the consultation 
responses’ July 2019. 
52 See, for instance, Prosecutor v Ademi and Norac, Decision for Referral to the Authorities of the Republic of 
Croatia Pursuant to Rule 11bis, IT-04-78-PT, 14 Sept 2005 at para 53 which noted ‘a fair trial of the Accused is 
properly complemented by a concern for fairness towards other interested parties, such as victims and the 
international community’. 
19 
  
is often argued as a good reason for failure to respond to allegations adequately or at all.53 
That succeeds only if the decision as to practicability is made in good faith and constantly 
and properly reassessed as conditions of conflict end or change. Although the exigencies of 
any situation should be taken into account, as I have maintained, they cannot provide a 
blanket, permanent excuse for avoiding the investigative duty altogether. Schmitt’s claim that 
IHL does not require the exhaustion of ‘all possible investigatory options’ may be correct. 
Many ideal standards that are relevant to the ‘victim’ or the ‘wider community’ would be 
largely unfeasible during hostilities. Equally, it should also be recognised that allegations of 
war crimes may arise sometime after the event. Such factors will affect the assessment of 
what kind of investigation might be realistically achievable. But if the investigatory duty is 
not to be subverted, a practicability principle (what is practicable in any circumstances) 
should demand the adoption of ‘next best’ methods where any situation temporarily hinders 
recognised standards of evidence gathering. It will not justify suspension, postponement or 
erasure of the investigative duty. It also requires regular review to respond to changing 
conditions.  
Both alleged individual and systemic wrongdoing would be captured by this 
requirement. Indeed, the revelation of patterns of abuse after the cessation of conflict could 
make practicable the investigation or re-investigation of individual IHL breaches.54 So, for 
instance, the later discovery of sanctioned training for abusive interrogation practices may 
require the examination and possible prosecution of individual examples of wrongdoing 
where that training was applied. Though there would still be reason to ‘learn lessons’ and 
change practices for the future (as has been the focus for public inquiries and the Systemic 
                                                          
53 This has been associated with clarifying the principle of ‘combat immunity’. See for instance Thomas 
Tugendhat and Laura Croft, ‘The Fog of Law: An introduction to the legal erosion of British fighting power’ 
(Policy Exchange, 2013). 
54 This would accord with the demand in McCann that ‘all the surrounding circumstances including such matters 
as the planning and control of the actions under examination’ must be considered in any proper investigation. 
See above n 29. 
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Issues Working Group in relation to Iraq and Afghanistan), this should not preclude 
accountability for those responsible for abusive practices (as architects, perpetrators or those 
who fail to prevent wrongdoing), not if the goal of ending impunity is to be properly 
respected.55     
The second primary principle is appropriate expertise. It requires that those tasked 
with fulfilling the investigative duty should be capable of undertaking the examination of any 
allegation using methods appropriate for the claim made. Even for the war context, this 
should not be confused with experience of military service any more than police-type 
enquiries necessitate experience in any professional field where wrongdoing is alleged. 
Though some (like Schmitt) argue that the military are best-placed to appreciate the 
circumstances pertaining to aspects of armed conflict, this seems false in the round. Only a 
diverse investigatory team will be capable of both assessing the broad range of possible war 
crimes and ensuring that the process is fair not only to the accused, but also to victims, 
survivors, their families, witnesses, and the wider national and international community 
where practicable. Only a diverse team will foster public confidence in the fairness of the 
process and ensure compliance with both first order and subsidiary principles.56 That team 
does, however, require access to expert knowledge of the context and means of military 
operation as well as obvious understanding of agreed IHL standards and how they might be 
applied.57 Schmitt may be correct in arguing that any  
                                                          
55 Failure to pursue perpetrators (as suggested by some political figures for historic alleged war crimes) would 
contravene Principle IV laid down at Nuremberg that superior orders could not relieve responsibility provided 
the perpetrator had a moral choice to disobey. See Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of 
the Nürnberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal 1950. 
56 Indirectly involved constituencies (national and international communities) may be treated fairly through the 
public dissemination of information found and the retention of accessible archives. See UNOHCHR 
‘Commissions of Inquiry and Fact-Finding Missions on International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: 
Guidelines and Practice 2015 available at 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/CoI_Guidance_and_Practice.pdf  
57 A distinction should be drawn here between issues of evidence and those of judgement. So, for instance, to 
kill a disproportionate number of civilians in any legitimate attack is a war crime, but it need not be for the 
investigator to judge what is or is not disproportionate. The accumulation of evidence is the investigative task 
although the investigating body must be alive to the applicable IHL principles. 
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investigator who does not understand, for example, weapons options, fuzing, guidance 
systems, angle of attack, optimal release altitudes, command and control relationships, 
communications capabilities, tactical options, available intelligence options, enemy 
practices, pattern of life analysis, collateral damage estimate methodology, human 
factors in a combat environment, and so forth, will struggle to effectively scrutinize 
an air strike.58  
 
But to suggest that ‘operational personnel’ alone possess this knowledge is absurd. 
Assigning exclusive investigative responsibility to either serving or ex-military personnel is 
unnecessary and most likely undesirable and contrary to notions of fairness when considered 
with the other primary principles. Equally, the range of expertise required should encompass 
predictable need beyond evidential investigation relating to military operations. The UN’s 
guidance regarding the examination of torture allegations (the Istanbul Protocol), for 
instance, sets out competences (in particular, medical, psychiatric and psychological 
expertise) deemed necessary in any enquiry to protect victims and their families.59 It would 
be appropriate for this expertise to be a standing component of any institution assigned the 
investigatory duty. It would also apply for the benefit of service personnel witnesses and 
accused too given the known impact of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and its relevance to 
the war context and the commission of war crimes.60 Such competencies are clearly not 
exclusive to the military. 
                                                          
58 Schmitt above n 43 at 84. 
59 UN High Commission for Human Rights, ‘Istanbul Protocol or Manual on the Effective Investigation and 
Documentation of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment’ 2004.  
60 See for instance B T Litz, N Stein, E Delaney, L Lebowitz, W P Nash, C Silva and S Maguen ‘Moral Injury 
and Moral Repair in War Veterans: A Preliminary Model and Intervention Strategy’ (2009) Clinical Psychology 
Review 695. 
22 
  
Both of the forgoing first order principles must be read in conjunction with the third: 
investigatory independence. Close association with alleged victim or accused (which would 
include state agents and institutions where systemic issues may be the concern) inevitably 
undermines any sense of trust in an investigative process. This applies to individual 
wrongdoing but has greater force in relation to systemic matters where responsibility may 
flow up from individual criminal acts through the chain of command to those involved in the 
military and political establishments. Some connection is inevitable given that states are 
obliged to investigate their own agents. Complete independence would, therefore, only be 
achieved if international agencies were engaged. Although that might be fulfilled through an 
institution such as the International Criminal Court (or similar appointed international body)61 
the practicability principle militates against such an ideal move. The Office of the Prosecutor 
of the ICC simply does not have the resources at present to undertake multiple investigations. 
Even if it did, the principle of complementarity establishes investigative responsibility as 
lying primarily with the state both as a means of preserving national sovereignty and in the 
interests of efficiency. This does not preclude oversight by international human rights and 
IHL bodies (that would be a sensible check and means of learning across jurisdictions) but 
none of these are equipped to fulfil the expertise principle uniformly.  
For the UK, given the absence of an existing sufficiently resourced external agent 
may mean that the next best solution to fulfil the independence principle would be a national 
body that lies outside the state’s military or political command structure. If this is accepted, 
then those past reviews conducted by the British Army vis-à-vis Afghanistan (Operation 
Telemeter) and Iraq (the Aitken Review) and Ministry of Defence led examinations such as 
the Systemic Issues Working Group (which has reviewed matters relating to military 
                                                          
61 Examples of non-national investigators appointed to examine any allegations are common. But these are not 
standing institutions.  
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protocols and procedures in Iraq), contravene the independence principle.62 A Services 
Prosecution Authority (mirrored by many Judge Advocate departments in other jurisdictions) 
so closely rooted in the military establishment (its offices are located in the Air Force base at 
Northolt) similarly presents a dependent character regardless of individual professional 
integrity or assertions of independence.63 An institution established outside the military 
establishment would be a sine qua non to fulfil this first order principle particularly when 
addressing suspected systemic crimes. The practicability principle may allow for interim 
investigation by military personnel, but the independence principle requires objective 
scrutiny unattached to existing chains of command (both military and governmental). 
None of these three first order principles are surprising. Universally applicable norms 
for national human rights institutions (NHRIs), for instance, similarly identify competence 
and independence as essential attributes.64 But little distinction is made for NHRIs between 
the conduct of investigations in peacetime and during war. Nor is there clarity on the scope or 
focus of their investigative duty. If criminal conduct is apparent, the assumption is that even 
if a matter comes to the attention of a human rights body, it will be passed to those military 
criminal justice authorities charged with enforcing military law. That approach does not 
accord with the plausible fulfilment of the consensus as to substantive and investigative 
duties vis-à-vis individual and systemic war crimes that I have outlined.  
 
Proposition 2: Subsidiary Principles  
                                                          
62 See Operation Telemeter report into the Royal Marines’ culture and ethos following the Alexander Blackman 
case available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/operation-telemeter-internal-review (accessed 19 
December 2018); ‘The Aitken Report: An Investigation into Cases of Deliberate Abuse and Unlawful Killing in 
Iraq in 2003 and 2004’ Ministry of Defence, 25 January 2008; SIWG above n 19. 
63 The SPA’s mission statement reflects the potential conflict, stating ‘Whilst maintaining independence from 
the service chain of command, the Service Prosecuting Authority fulfils its functions in support of operational 
effectiveness of the Armed Forces throughout the world.’ See http://spa.independent.gov.uk/  
64 Principles relating to the Status of National Institutions (The Paris Principles), approved by the UN General 
Assembly (A/RES/48/134) 20 December 1993 identify essential characteristics for NHRIs: they focus 
specifically on competence, independence and plurality.  
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The first order principles above lay the foundations for fulfilling the investigative duty. 
Though necessary and non-negotiable they are not sufficient. My second proposition is that 
adherence to a series of subsidiary principles is desirable in order both to ensure fair process 
in any particular context and to judge the adequacy of a particular examination. These 
however, should be interpreted to accord with the first order principles. In particular, they are 
applicable as and when practicable.  
There are numerous candidates developed to ensure accountability by state agents for 
serious human rights abuses and war crimes coupled with contemporary notions of a ‘fair 
trial’. But if one does not presume prosecution is the sole goal of any investigation, it seems 
apt to tailor principles accordingly. Though these do not preclude prosecution they would not 
necessarily suffice should prosecution appear warranted once investigations had commenced. 
Consequently, I propose that promptness and respect for basic standards of natural justice 
(which inevitably may contain a number of subsidiary standards) are salient for a modern 
liberal democracy such as the UK. There is also good reason to add public notification of 
outcomes (reasonable transparency) although this has less to do with the resolution of the 
investigative duty than observance of the additional need to maintain public confidence. I 
take this to be a necessary element of public accountability that would be defeated if 
investigations are unduly secretive and undertaken by agents of the state. As with the 
proposed first order principles, I defend these subsidiary ones briefly below. 
 Promptness is easily defended. Failure to gather evidence of all kinds in close 
proximity to any event is a clear threat to the integrity of any investigation. It undermines the 
dependability of that evidence but also faith and trust in the state’s willingness to resolve 
allegations. What is possible and practicable remains a significant factor to consider when 
assessing any examination. This is one area where the UK’s legal responses to war crime type 
allegations have been palpably deficient. The delay in military investigation, public inquiry 
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and police-led examination has seen several cases of established abuse (the Baha Mousa case 
perhaps being the most prominent) remain unresolved.65 Promptness is still relevant to 
allegations that relate to older conflicts (such as Northern Ireland and Cyprus) once evidence 
comes to light that requires an investigation to be commenced or re-ignited.  
 The principle of resource adequacy is also applicable. Any investigation should be 
provided with sufficient funding and resources ‘to ensure that its credibility is never in doubt’ 
and it is capable of resolving the allegation.66 Although the need to consider costs is 
understandable, it should not prejudice proper and timely investigation. It follows that any 
permanent institution charged with fulfilling the investigatory duty must be adequately 
resourced too. 
Respect for norms of natural justice seems apt as an essential principle as well. 
Guarantees for those accused follow the nature of accusation given the significance attached 
to war crimes. Even if the aim of the investigative process is not prosecution (there may be 
good reasons for looking to alternative means of resolution) maintaining anonymity, the right 
to representation and information regarding the progress of investigation are all plausible 
safeguards for any accused. None should be allowed to interfere with the timely functioning 
of investigations to the extent that their viability is threatened. Recognising the specific 
position of combatants here is a reasonable acknowledgement of the perceived act, the war 
context, and their potential continuing role as serving personnel.  
Addressing the interests of victims and their families should also be a subsidiary 
principle to fulfil broad notions of fairness. That would accord with human rights 
                                                          
65 After identifying numerous individuals culpable in the death of Baha Mousa, investigations were re-opened 
by the Iraq Historic Allegations Team in 2013. No further prosecution has commenced. 
66 Principle 11, UN Human Rights Commission ‘Set of principles for the protection and promotion of human 
rights through action to combat impunity’ updated in 2005 relate to crimes in war as much as human rights 
abuse. This is a product of the attempt to merge IHRL with IHL. The advocated principles should not be 
dismissed for this reason. The guidelines are designed to ‘assist States in developing effective measures’ to 
bring perpetrators to ‘account – whether in criminal, civil, administrative or disciplinary proceedings’. 
26 
  
expectations and some interpretations of criminal justice duties as well as accounts of the rule 
of law particularly in international discourse. ‘[S]ecuring justice and dignity for victims’ is a 
legitimate process requirement in transitional justice.67 But if I am right that context is vital, 
then an obligation to keep victims informed about the investigative progress might be 
dispensable temporarily as a matter of practicability. The better alternative would be to 
incorporate the victim’s and their family’s right to know (already recognised in IHL to a 
limited extent as well as IHRL) as a specific element within a general duty of public 
disclosure and transparency.68 This would reflect the need to observe impartiality in 
investigations and to protect the interests of victims of war crimes to maintain public 
confidence in the investigative process. Though some may see transparency as impracticable 
and perhaps a threat to security in times of war, the release of information to ensure a 
reasonable degree of public knowledge and fulfil any putative ‘right to know’ by victims and 
public alike is a natural product of the application of the first order principles. A holistically 
fair process would be the more likely result.   
Identifying these subsidiary principles (others might lay claim for inclusion) only 
takes us so far. My third proposition looks to the means by which such principles might best 
be applied.   
 
Proposition 3: A Dedicated Investigative Institution 
To reflect the specific consensus on standards and investigative duty and to comply with the 
first order and subsidiary principles I have advanced requires, I suggest, the construction of a 
standing institution tailored for these purposes. No single institution in the UK currently has 
this role. Instead, there exists a disparate range of agencies and ad hoc processes that have 
                                                          
67 Report of the UN Secretary General on ‘The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict 
societies’ (23/08/2004) para 38 
68 The Hillsborough Independent Panel, which reported in 2012 to general acclaim, provides an example of a 
process premised on inclusivity. 
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collectively failed to fulfil the investigative duty in a coherent and generally fair manner. As a 
result, numerous bodies and processes have examined allegations amounting to war crimes 
without any coordinated approach. This is particularly fatal to fulfilling substantive and 
procedural duties with regard to systemic wrongdoing where the open collation of 
information on practices is vital.  
 So, although the Armed Forces Act 2006 attempted to regularise the investigative 
process, requiring serious crimes to be investigated, the military police have not proven 
capable of consistently responding to allegations. The Iraq situation has produced successive 
investigative failures as identified in various judicial review proceedings and recognised by 
UK courts and the European Court of Human Rights alike in relation to individual cases.69 
On systemic issues, even greater failure has been evident. No institution has succeeded in 
confronting matters that have indicated general systemic problems. As I have already 
mentioned and discussed elsewhere, internal military reviews have lacked independence.70 
Public inquiries have been too singular in their approach to consider potential widespread 
abuse. Government appointed bodies or examinations have also contravened first order and 
subsidiary principles through their close relationship with those state institutions who might 
be involved in enabling systemic concerns to continue or to flourish. The same applies to the 
conflict in Northern Ireland. The government may have launched a public consultation on 
how to address the legacy of the province’s past, (which must (a) meet the needs of victims 
and survivors; (b) promote reconciliation; (c) ‘reflect broad political consensus and be 
balanced, fair, equitable, and crucially, proportionate’; and (d) ‘be consistent with the rule of 
law’)71 but no accord as to how allegations of military conduct may be addressed have been 
                                                          
69 Al-Skeini And Others v The United Kingdom (Grand Chamber), ECtHR, Appl. no. 55721/07, 7 July 2011 para 
161 et seq. 
70 Williams above n 2. 
71 Northern Ireland Office, ‘Addressing the Legacy of Northern Ireland’s Past: Analysis of the consultation 
responses’ July 2019 at 3. 
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reached. Those proposals contained in the Stormont House Agreement in 2014, including an 
independent Historical Investigations Unit to deal with ‘Troubles-related deaths’ would only 
apply to Northern Ireland and would not confront possible systemic issues related to ill-
treatment, torture during detention or any other allegations that relate to the spread of 
possible war crimes. 
Neither situation, and nor that of other past allegations, can be adequately resolved by 
resort to the courts through civil litigation. Compensation through a civil process is no 
substitute for the accountability requirements relating to punitive, reformatory or 
reconciliatory justice aims that are apt when serious wrongdoing is at stake, and that are 
legitimate demands of national and international communities. Nor would the prospects for 
revealing systemic issues be uniform.   
 How then could the institutional vacuum be rectified? As I have mentioned, although 
the operation of international bodies, tasked with either policing the investigative duty or 
fulfilling it in the absence of national action, would appear in theory to offer adherence to the 
first order principles of independence and expertise, in practice their remoteness militates 
against successful intervention. Difficulties of access to situations and national information 
(which will be restricted) together with limited resources invariably undermine effective 
engagement. Reluctance to challenge national sovereignty except in extreme circumstances is 
also a primary containment. In the context of a functioning liberal democracy, the assumption 
that the state will fulfil its duty ensures considerable latitude is given by these international 
bodies. The principle of complementarity expresses this legal approach.72 In the UK’s case, it 
has allowed the confused and chaotic response to the Iraq allegations and those relating to 
Northern Ireland to develop largely without international interference. If intervention does 
                                                          
72 The Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC, though engaged in reviewing the UK’s investigations into Iraq and 
Afghanistan allegations, remains watchful rather than interventionist. See Report on Preliminary Examination 
Activities 5 December 2018. 
29 
  
eventually occur, it is unlikely to fulfil those subsidiary principles simply through the lapse of 
time. 
 If standing international bodies do not present as adequate, nor, I suggest, do ad hoc 
international or national commissions of inquiry. Though a favoured response to incidences 
of gross human rights abuse and serious violations of IHL, subsidiary principles are again 
threatened by the inevitable delay in any commission’s appointment and conduct of its 
enquiries.73 Equally, any other national ad hoc response to allegations, evident in public 
inquiries or specially appointed investigative commissions, is likely to fail for the same 
reasons particularly on systemic issues. That might be the ‘next best’ solution where a state 
has failed to observe its investigative duty in an isolated case, but it would not be the 
preferred choice for a functioning, liberal democracy with significant current and past as well 
as probable future military commitments.  
More plausible for better satisfaction of first order and subsidiary principles would be 
a standing national institution designed to address war crimes type allegations in both 
international and internal armed conflicts. That would not preclude undertaking other duties, 
such as national human rights review, provided the principle of expertise were not prejudiced. 
Full appreciation of the military context and the substantive standards I outlined in section 1, 
would be necessary to ensure effectiveness. It is not obvious that familiarity with human 
rights or domestic criminal investigation would suffice. Indeed, it might hamper for lack of 
expertise in the war context. Neither would a military based institution fulfil the first order 
principle of independence when reviewing patterns of wrongdoing. By definition, close 
association through service or command would undermine confidence in this respect. This is 
not to say that individual military and other experience could not called upon to help 
                                                          
73 Fact-finding missions are part of the international human rights law landscape. See Federica D’Alessandra 
‘The Accountability Turn in Third Wave Human Rights Fact-Finding’ (2017) 33(84) Utrecht Journal of 
International and European Law 59-76. 
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discharge the institutional function. That would be a matter of particular and constant 
evaluation as would adherence to both sets of principles. 
Finally, as I have argued, the priority attached to investigation as a prelude to 
individual criminal prosecution can be a hindrance to balancing fairness in the operation of 
any institution fulfilling the investigatory duty. Even accepting that punishment for war 
crimes is a moral necessity, it is not the only desirable outcome of investigation. Both IHRL 
and IHL recognise the importance of other goals, notably to provide victims or their 
dependents with effective remedies, to ensure the public’s right to know what has been done 
in its name, to preserve memory of war crimes as a necessary component of deterrence and 
potential ‘public catharsis’, and to learn lessons so as to help prevent recurrence of systemic 
and individual violations. None of these aims is unfamiliar to legal structures designed to 
address wrongdoing. They are inherent in administrative law principles and public inquiries 
and therefore applicable. Preparation for prosecution should not therefore be the exclusive 
aim for any standing institution. There is good reason to suppose that many breaches of IHL 
standards beyond wilful infliction of suffering (including killing) will not necessitate an 
investigation as prelude to a criminal process. The camp conditions in Iraq criticised by the 
court as below acceptable IHL standards in Alseran and Others v. MoD demand systemic 
scrutiny but are unlikely to provoke individual criminal prosecution.74 The same might apply 
for the lack of military and political preparedness for UK troops going to war adequately 
protected against predictable dangers.75 Nonetheless, a criminal justice response should not 
be precluded; it would depend on what was found through a systemic review.  
Having a criminal justice possibility in mind still necessitates paying due attention to 
the quality of evidence gathering and its preservation, although that would not be the sole 
                                                          
74 Alseran and others v Ministry of Defence [2017] EWHC 3289 (QB) 14. 
75 Smith and others v Ministry of Defence [2013] UKSC 41 established UK jurisdiction for Article 2 ECHR 
breaches relating to troops serving abroad. 
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premise of evidential accumulation.76 Nor would it mean that the standards of evidence 
applicable in domestic criminal prosecution had to be applied in all circumstances. It may be 
prudent for this to be the default position, if only to ensure the prospects of appropriate 
criminal prosecutions were not endangered, but circumstances might dictate a variation of 
this approach. Again, this is not a strange assumption in the conduct of plausible public 
inquiries or commissions. There have been solid precedents in the UK and other jurisdictions 
(where transitional justice and international criminal standards have been developed.) One 
example, the 1993 UN appointed truth commission of El Salvador, which examined the 
circumstances of the country’s civil war during the 1980s, offers some inspiration. It chose to 
investigate cases by weighing ‘the representative nature of the case, the availability of 
sufficient evidence, the investigatory resources available to the Commission, the time needed 
to conduct an exhaustive investigation and the issue of impunity’.77 It was specifically 
mandated to adopt a procedure which was ‘reliable and expeditious and may yield results in 
the short term, without prejudice to the obligations incumbent on the Salvadorian courts to 
solve such cases and impose the appropriate penalties on the culprits’. The Commission 
interpreted its mandate to examine  
 
(a) Individual cases or acts which, by their nature, outraged Salvadorian society 
and/or international opinion; and (b) A series of individual cases with similar 
characteristics revealing a systematic pattern of violence or ill-treatment which, taken 
together, equally outraged Salvadorian society, especially since their aim was to 
intimidate certain sectors of that society. 
                                                          
76 Retaining information generally (including that which would not satisfy as evidence in a criminal prosecution) 
would still be required for assessing state responsibility questions and providing a record for public purposes. 
The archival function would be vital to fulfil the inter-generational fairness issues of the right to know. 
77 The Commission on the Truth for El Salvador, From Madness to Hope: the 12 year war in El Salvador report 
https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/ElSalvador-Report.pdf  
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The two types were not treated as mutually exclusive on the basis that ‘many of the so 
called individual acts of violence which had the greatest impact on public opinion also had 
characteristics revealing systematic patterns of violence.’ However, to achieve its aims in the 
time allotted, the Commission adopted a confidential procedure for the hearing of evidence. 
No case was reported unless accompanied by a description of the ‘degree of certainty’ 
regarding its truth. One of three standards had to be attained: ‘Overwhelming evidence - 
conclusive or highly convincing evidence to support the Commission's finding’; ‘Substantial 
evidence - very solid evidence to support the Commission's finding’; or Sufficient evidence - 
more evidence to support the Commission's finding than to contradict it.’ It did not adopt a 
‘due process’ model nor did it determine the ‘rights or obligations of certain individuals 
under the law.’ This was necessary in the circumstances faced, where finding the ‘truth’ was 
deemed essential for national peace initiatives and there were still fears of reprisals against 
witnesses.  
Even if the El Salvador commission approach is not pertinent to the UK or desirable 
(if only because of the ad hoc nature of its mandate), there are still lessons here concerning 
the representative focus of the Commission, the denotation of evidence and the value of 
publicly presenting the ‘truth’ (recognised explicitly as variable) surrounding abuses within a 
conflict. Similarly, the standards of proof considered as appropriate in international human 
rights investigations, which are also variable as precursors to further enquiry or prosecution, 
provide useful precedents.78 But evidently my scheme requires a national institution that is 
capable of fulfilling the first order and subsidiary principles specifically in relation to the 
implementation of IHL norms in an integrated way. 
                                                          
78 See Stephen Wilkinson ‘Standards of Proof in international Humanitarian and Human Rights Fact-Finding 
and Inquiry Missions’ Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights 2012. 
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 This would not be satisfied by recourse to those standing national institutions with an 
IHL mandate recommended by the ICRC since 1995.79 Such bodies only hold an advisory or 
coordination function within the executive not independent of it. Promoting and developing 
IHL norms has been preferred to fulfilling the investigatory duty. Indeed, in relation to 
monitoring and evaluating specific IHL breaches, the ICRC emphasises: 
 
this is not a typical role of such committees, whose purpose is to act not as a judicial 
body but as an advisory body. Ideally, a separate body would be responsible for 
monitoring and reporting on IHL violations as, if this were to be done by the national 
IHL committee, it might affect its relationship with other bodies with mandates in this 
area – for example, commissions supporting the collection of evidence for war-crime 
prosecutions or the judiciary – and might be perceived as conflicting with the national 
IHL committee’s primary function.80    
 
The UK has followed this advice, establishing an IHL committee in 1999 but without 
creating a standing body to monitor and evaluate IHL breaches. The committee only consists 
of representatives from government departments and the British Red Cross with a mandate to 
consider implementing legislation and dissemination. Apart from anodyne reports on IHL 
norms and the UK context, nothing has been mentioned publicly on the multiple allegations 
from recent and more dated conflicts.81  
                                                          
79 26th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent: Resolution 1, Annex II: Meeting of the 
Intergovernmental Group of Experts for the Protection of War Victims, Geneva, 23–27 January 1995: 
Recommendations: https://www. icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/resolution/26-international-
conferenceresolution-1-1995.htm    
80 ICRC National Committees and Similar Entities on International Humanitarian Law: Guidelines for Success 
December 2018 available at https://www.icrc.org/en/document/national-committees-and-similar-entities-
international-humanitarian-law-guidelines-success  
81 See for instance https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/international-humanitarian-law-and-the-uk-
government  
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The general failure to create a single body to investigate allegations has not been 
remedied by other processes. Individual public inquiries (Baha Mousa, Al Sweady and now 
the coronial process of the Iraq Fatalities Investigations) may have fulfilled a limited didactic 
function but they have not acted as appropriate preparatory mechanisms for prosecution 
where potentially applicable or some other resolution. Nor have they been able to examine 
systemic issues unhindered. Indeed, the proceedings have been premised on protecting 
participants from criminal sanction in the interests of reaching the truth of a matter. Even 
where evidence emerges of serious breaches of IHL, there has been little or no criminal 
justice process provoked. The Baha Mousa Inquiry prompted no further prosecutions despite 
the identification of systems and individuals responsible for IHL breaches. The Bloody 
Sunday, Loughinisland, Ballymurphy and Stalker/Sampson inquiries relating to Northern 
Ireland have operated over decades without criminal prosecution.82 The Iraq Fatalities 
Investigations coronial process appears equally impotent though may have been successful in 
finding facts related to some individual killings.83 This experience reflects the apparent 
unfairness redolent within the spectrum of responses the UK has adopted even if some 
reparatory justice has followed through government payment of compensation.84    
The special construction of a standing national institution (rather than ad hoc 
commissions) to investigate war crimes to accord with the principles I have outlined would 
be a more plausible approach. It could work closely with international institutions such as the 
ICC to develop and share its expertise and experience. Many of the issues of unfairness to all 
concerned could then be addressed in specific and tailored manner.85  
                                                          
82 In 2019 ‘Soldier F’ was charged with murder in relation to Bloody Sunday: see 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/mar/14/prosecutors-explain-bloody-sunday-charges-against-
soldier-f  
83 The sad death of Sir George Newman in June 2019 leaves the process uncertain, which highlights the 
precarious nature of these ad hoc judge led processes. 
84 Out of court settlements have seen compensation paid in multiple cases, most recently to Greek Cypriots who 
claimed war crimes had been committed by the UK prior to independence. See above n 21.  
85 It would also comply with various international human rights commitments. See, for instance, the ‘Istanbul 
Protocol’ (above n 59) article 75 which provides that ‘Where investigative procedures are inadequate because of 
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Conclusion 
If the UK is to construct an appropriate institution to fulfil the investigatory duty fairly, its 
imagination should not be constrained by current structures. The Commanding Officer, 
Military Police and Ministry of Defence nexus, which defines responses to all military 
crimes, fails the first order and subsidiary principles I have identified. War Crimes as special 
crimes require a different response from that applied to ordinary serious crimes committed by 
military personnel. Military Police embedded in the Armed Forces or Ministry of Defence 
operated units cannot be expected to investigate command responsibility and systemic issues 
given their subordinate position amidst the institutions within which responsibility may lie. It 
is also questionable whether they could examine fairly war crimes that arise from battle 
operations, where issues of proportionality and necessity in attacks against civilians, for 
instance, are in play. 
For some, no doubt, this observation reflects nothing more than current thinking on 
established process rights attached to the right to life and the right not to be tortured. The 
assumption that the military discipline regime should extend to war crimes as military 
criminal wrongs remains, nonetheless, a strong one despite failure to adhere to the first order 
principle of independence and to understand the special and complex nature of duties arising 
if war crimes are committed. Much like the introduction of the Independent Office for Police 
Conduct was to resolve public concerns over Police behaviour, a body outside the military 
and government establishment would be a more plausible route to resolve fairness issues for 
                                                          
a lack of resources or expertise, the appearance of bias, the apparent existence of a pattern of abuse or other 
substantial reasons, States shall pursue investigations through an independent commission of inquiry or similar 
procedure. Members of that commission must be chosen for their recognized impartiality, competence and 
independence as individuals. In particular, they must be independent of any institution, agency or person that 
may be the subject of the inquiry.’ Article 109 also stresses the need for any Commission to be impartial and 
‘not closely associated with any individual, State entity, political party or other organization potentially 
implicated in the torture.’   
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all constituents in war crimes allegations. However, the IOPC is an apt model only so far as it 
is able to consider individual allegations. Systemic matters, in the guise of ‘super-complaints’ 
that relate to ‘a feature, or combination of features, of policing’ which ‘is, or appears to be, 
significantly harming the interests of the public’, have to be made to Her Majesty’s Chief 
Inspector of Constabulary.86 Nonetheless, together the scrutiny of policing through these 
schemes provides a plausible template for achieving similar military accountability. 
It might be tempting to identify the Equality and Human Rights Commission as a 
suitable candidate for these functions. This should not be discounted, as I have mentioned 
elsewhere, although its current framework and organisation as well as mandate are not 
adequate.87 Nonetheless, it has occasionally been interested in human rights questions 
applicable to the war context, intervening in cases regarding the extra-territorial application 
of the ECHR to UK troops serving overseas and raising concerns over detention practices.88  
But it has not assumed a systematic approach to military related matters and does not yet 
fulfil the first order principles beyond independence. If Mark Osiel’s general critique against 
human rights activists and lawyers (that they are loath to understand the war context) is 
accepted, then specific expertise has to be acquired in both the substantive obligations and the 
possible circumstances in which they apply.89 It is not sufficient to assume human rights 
experts are competent to comply with the multiple fairness issues at stake.  
Equally, current international guidance on the operation of both national human rights 
institutions (of which the EHRC is one) and IHL commissions does not recommend coherent 
war crimes investigative processes as part of their remit. The UN’s Paris Principles are 
                                                          
86 Section 29A, Police Reform Act 2002. Super-complaints can only be brought by designated bodies, which 
consist currently of a small number of NGOs including Liberty and Southall Black Sisters. For a full list see 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/police-super-complaints-designated-bodies/designated-bodies   
87 Williams above n 2. 
88 See Commission interventions on torture at https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/our-human-rights-
work/monitoring-and-promoting-un-treaties/convention-against-torture-and-other 
89 Osiel, above n 37 at 131-2. 
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premised on general promotion and review of international human rights treaties for the 
former and the ICRC advises against interference in the criminal justice arena for the latter.90 
Neither countenance the specific circumstances pertaining in war that necessitate scrutiny of 
both individual and systemic wrongdoing as a matter of international criminal justice 
imperatives. Though lessons will be learned from human rights, on the one hand, and 
overarching review of IHL developments, on the other, neither institutional type (as currently 
conceived) will do. 
 Nor would it be satisfactory to perpetuate the principally military or governmental 
character of addressing systemic matters (as evident in the Iraq allegations and Northern 
Ireland in particular). Neither are capable of fulfilling the first order principles I have 
advocated and have contravened subsidiary principles in their operation too. The principle of 
independence alone would work against either the military or ministerial route. They are 
currently part of the problem, failing fairness standards for victims, service personnel 
accused, and the wider community’s right to know. As it stands, this leaves them perpetually 
open to the kind of remedy seeking human rights judicial review or civil litigation actions 
that have contributed to the incoherence of response to allegations. Parliamentary procedures 
are also incapable of fulfilling the investigatory duty even if the courts may look to the 
political realm to assert control over systemic issues scrutiny.91 Given the irregular and 
under-resourced capacity of parliamentary committees to conduct any inquiry that can both 
discover the truth of a concern as well as provoke criminal justice measures should they be 
warranted, they are ill-equipped to undertake this role. The ten year examination of 
complicity in torture and extra-ordinary rendition by UK security services by the Intelligence 
                                                          
90 The Paris Principles above n 64. 
91 In R (Ali Zaki Mousa and others) v SSD (No. 2) [2013] EWHC 1412 at para 224 systemic issues were 
specifically left for parliamentary scrutiny. 
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and Security Committee points to prolonged delay in any scrutiny that by definition will 
breach the subsidiary principles as described above.92 
 If there is no candidate identifiable amidst existing UK organisations, would a 
separate standing war crimes investigation institution be a credible solution? There is little 
doubt that the UK has the resources to construct such an organisation. It could follow the 
form of dedicated war crimes units established in France, Germany and the Netherlands.93 
Though these address universal jurisdiction cases (grave international crimes committed in 
third party state conflicts), the principles underpinning their constitution are relevant. A 
similar mandated institution in the UK (internally and extra-territorially focused) could be 
cast to allow for both prompting criminal processes through the established system of 
criminal justice and, where appropriate, alternative ends compatible with the broader aims of 
international justice.94 Its specialised nature would also enable expertise in the war context, 
the treatment of military personnel post conflict, and, where significant issues of social harm 
arise, to be central to the investigation of both individual and systemic wrongdoing. It might 
even be prudent to combine the role of the Military Ombudsman, where fair treatment within 
the armed forces would work in conjunction with the public commitment to uphold the laws 
of war as well as any covenant with the military. The two are not incompatible given that the 
latter is likely to be dependent on compliance with the former at least to the extent that clear 
failure to adhere to and enforce the laws of war by the Armed Forces would breach any social 
commitment to treat military personnel with a respect deserved by their service. Equally, a 
standing institution would have the task of monitoring response to the conclusions arising 
                                                          
92 See Intelligence and Security Committee Report: Detainee Mistreatment and Rendition 2001-2010, 28 June 
2018, HC 1113. 
93 For details see Human Rights Watch Report ‘The Long Arm of Justice: Lessons from Specialized War Crimes 
Units in France, Germany, and the Netherlands’ (2014) available at 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/09/16/europe-national-courts-extend-reach-justice 
94 A War Crimes Team exists in the Metropolitan Police as part of its Counter Terrorism Command but little 
information is public for good reasons of security. See https://www.cps.gov.uk/publication/war-crimescrimes-
against-humanity-guidance-making-application-dpp-consent-application 
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from investigation. Public inquiries are often used to identify lessons to be learned but 
frequently fail to provide a mechanism for ensuring recommendations are applied.95 The 
government holds that responsibility but fails in the independence principle when fulfilling it. 
An independent institution tasked with following up decisions with on-going scrutiny would 
provide a more effective tool. 
 I recognise that the political mood for such a development is currently absent. That is 
partly the result of a failure of politics and law to engage with the known nature of military 
action and its consequences. Responses to date have approached such matters in a feigned 
state of surprise, at best, reacting to allegations rather than reasonably predicting their 
occurrence. As I have argued elsewhere, public law provides insufficient remedy for this 
political and governmental failure to adhere to values and principles that are purportedly 
central to domestic and international commitments.96 Nor would the political proposal to 
introduce a statute of limitations for the investigation of service personnel and veterans be 
likely to solve those fairness issues arising.97 Given the political and legal failings, adopting a 
specific solution to the problem of due accountability through an institution designed as I 
have advocated would stand a better chance of developing a public ethos that is not plagued 
by unfairness.  
 
 
                                                          
95 National Audit Office Investigation into Government Funded Inquiries Report (21 May 2018) concluded that 
‘[t]here is no organisation across government or Parliament with responsibility for monitoring and tracking 
whether recommendations have been implemented and ensuring that inquiries have the intended impact’ paras 
3.17 and 3.18.  
96 Williams above n 2. 
97 In the context of Northern Ireland, it has been reported that the ‘clear majority of all respondents to the 
consultation argued that a Statute of Limitations or amnesty would not be appropriate for Troubles-related 
matters’. Northern Ireland Office, Legacy report above n 51 at 21. 
